Biological weapons are a generally only a tool for shooting yourself in the foot — when they work at all.
For example, most Americans are not aware that we have been the subject of two Anthrax attacks, not just one.
Remember the chemical weapon cycle? ~10 years to develop, then more time to weaponize. Well, the first Anthrax attack it turns out that the strain they cultured and got ready to deploy is a strain that is deadly to many animals but is used to vaccinate humans. Which is why you haven’t heard about it. The other attack? Killed two people — both with compromised immune systems.
Smallpox attacks in the early Americas? Failures (of course that is partially because Smallpox had already killed off the 90% of the population that was vulnerable long before someone thought of using it as a weapon). But for most people who would like to use biological weapons, the most likely targets have better public health and better resistance to the agents than those who want to deploy them. To the extent that any disease process gets started, it is more likely to affect those who use the weapons than those who are the targets (in the long run). Thus the “shooting yourself in the foot” comment about them.
But what about nuclear weapons? Wouldn’t it be neat if you found a substance more expensive than gold, difficult and dangerous to work with, that you could blow up to do damage to your enemies at an efficiency rate of about 5% of conventional weapons? Isn’t that what everyone wants? Or why they are often referred to as “not enough bang for the buck.”
This is about to get a little longer, but I am going to explain why they sometimes make sense, and why they sometimes do not, and why if your enemy has them, you just wait it out as the weapons rot away.
- Nuclear weapons are generally more expensive than conventional ones for the damage done.
- Nuclear weapons are generally harder to use with precision than conventional weapons and require greater precision in manufacturing.
- Nuclear weapons are made from (a) very valuable and (b) very toxic substances presenting both theft and poisoning issues.
- Nuclear weapons require different delivery systems than conventional weapons (again, the weaponization issue).
- Nuclear weapons, based as they are on nuclear decay (and on materials that decay much faster than normal decay, in configurations where decay is faster still) tend to rot (where as standard explosives, such as HMX and such pretty much last forever).
- Nuclear weapons have much of their expense in re-manufacture (as you take rotting weapons and make them new again — the worse pollution in the Soviet Union came from re-manufacture sites, the Silkwood story involves a similar site in the United States).
As a result, if your opponent has nuclear weapons you can just wait them out until their weapons have all rotted. To use a nuclear weapon is like turning over a sack of gold bars to whoever is supposed to deploy it.
So, when would you ever want to develop or use such a weapon?
- When you are very averse to taking casualties. An ICBM is unlikely to create the same level of casualties as a large scale bombing raid.
- When you have an enemy who is able to defend against conventional attacks, but not against nuclear ones (e.g. someone with anti-aircraft weapons, but no ABM system).
- When you have concentrated high value targets (or why the army concluded that enemy military units were the perfect target for nuclear weapons).
- When your enemy occupies a very small area (as my father commented when I asked him how large Israel was “three fusion weapons”).
- When you are bluffing (the original use of atomic bombs) or otherwise making a statement (the mythic status of nuclear weapons gives those who possess them status, or perceived status).
Iran would be much more dangerous if they were developing fuel oil bombs. Pakistan would have caused a lot more trouble if they were making LAWs and exporting them at a discount. North Korea’s deterrent is a set of many square miles of mortar artillery units in reach of Seoul, Korea which is much too close the the border.
In all three cases the nuclear weapon development programs have been terribly expensive, not produced anywhere near the firepower that a conventional weapons program would have produced, and have failed to create any weapons that the countries involved can use against real targets. Basically they are stuck with guarding what they have (or are yet to have) until it rots away and has to be re-manufactured, assuming they can do that without poisoning large portions of the countryside and irreplaceable technicians.
Sure, if you want to deter a much larger army from attacking you and you can spend money, just not deploy troops (the U.S. Military in Europe in the cold war), tactical nuclear weapons make sense. If you just can not deliver conventional weapons (notice the utter failure, to date, of such attempts against Israel) you might be tempted to develop other weapons you still can not deliver …
But for the most part, WMDs are a fools game, a waste of time, resources and attention.
For historical purposes, you can compare from WWII. A typical 1667 tons of bomb raid vs. an atomic bomb in Japan cost less for the bombing raid and killed more people (Hiroshima 70k, Nagasaki 36k, bomb raid 83k) (Those numbers could well be wrong, comparing my sources declassified in the 1970s with Wikipedia is interesting, since with Wiki the numbers are about doubled for each bombing raid and Mark Selden argues convincingly that the conventional weapon attack probably killed closer to half a million people — or 16ok, 90k and 500k for alternative numbers –pushing the bang for the buck far in favor of conventional weapons instead of solidly in favor). The basic conclusion that developed with the military was that nuclear weapons were much more expensive, all in all, than conventional ones, though they were extremely useful for attacks on military units [see, e.g. Atomic Weapons in Land Combat by G. C. and W. R. Kinter Reinhardt (1954)].
Anyway, that takes you through understanding the so-called weapons of mass destruction. For the most part they are expensive, in-effective, untrustworthy and dangerous. Some have an interesting place because they allow you to substitute technology for manpower in certain applications, and they have mythological proportions and meanings. But they really are a misdirection from an external perspective.
Enough on that topic. Perhaps I’ll finish up on utopias next post.
Wheat & Tares 
The value of nukes is obvious; it’s that they give the attacker the ability to strike with sudden and overwhelming force.
That on a “bang for buck” basis Hiroshima and/or Nagasaki proved to be more expensive than, say, Curtis LeMay’s firebombing raids (ex: March 8-9, 1945, estimated dead ranges from 85K to 100K, and an area comparable to the damage at Hiroshima obliterated by the firestorm), they had the considerable psychological advantage of being from one plane than a thousand. So, whereas the expectation of the Tokyo was in hampering the considerable small-scale war production (parts suppliers to larger factories) believed to be taking place in the targeted area, the expectation of using the atomic weapons was that it would impress on the Japanese military the futility of further resistance. In that, success was partial. As Vanevar Bush predicted, it would take at least two strikes to convince the Japanese that we potentially had an arsenal full of these weapons (in fact, it would have been at least three weeks before another implosion weapon could have be ready, and five more by October 1945). It was as much the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 8/8/1945 that convinced Japan to throw in the towel.
The value of nukes, since then, has been deterrence. Like it or not, as much as they are associated with WWIII, they’ll likely forestalled it. Their existence is hardly a misdirection of resources, but they don’t replace a “conventional” military by any means. Just as during “Dubya-dubya-two, da big one”, as much as we touted air power, we still had to send in the infantry to mop up and take ground. Even the much-touted tanks were found to have their limitations…ask the few tankers that survived Okinawa…one of the fave tactics of the Japanese was to dig a hole in a road, get some young kid into it with a bomb and a rock, then cover up. When a Sherman would pass over, the kid would strike the bomb’s detonator with the rock, with usually tragic results for the kid, the tank, and its crew. Sorta the then-example of Japanese “high tech” with regard to a roadside IED! The Okinawans rightfully resent the US military, but considering what we fought against, I fail to see how it could have been done any different.
I largely agree with you, although a country that is afraid of taking casualties on offense is likely to be even more afraid of taking them on defense. Hence, the mythic power of nukes; although few of us alive have seen a sky full of warplanes sufficient to dump 1667 tons of bombs, we’ve all seen that one mushroom cloud.
For comparison:
http://www.txchnologist.com/2011/nuclear-space-rockets-and-the-most-fascinating-nasa-man-youve-never-heard-of
steve, you have convinced me to quit seeking nuclear weapons. now I will save my money for conventional weapons in case my neighbors give me any guff. 🙂
mh:
Yup. When people talk to me about stocking up on gold, I always think, “if it gets THAT bad, you’d be better off spending your money on firepower.”
I’ll note that the 2nd amendment obviously anticipated nukes in your cellar and nerve gas in the attic.
Letters of Marque and Reprisal meant ships of the line in the hands of individuals, those were the WMD of the era, city destroying weapons (and, in the hands of people like Sir Francis Drake, actually used to destroy cities).
Or proof that I’m more than willing to live with some restrictions on arms.
Aww…quit pissin’ around and gimme a light saber for personal defense, and a Super Star Destroyer to drive around and blow crap up. Just give me the model that can transmit a clear signal through an asteriod field.
Douglas — you have the R&D budget, I’ve got people to set you up with 😉