I recently listened to a podcast discussion on Data Over Dogma with cognitive scientist and philosopher Neil Van Leeuwen about his book Religion as Make-Believe: A Theory of Belief, Imagination, and Group Identity [1]. The podcast episode is titled “Is Religion Make-Believe?” which is a bit more aggressive, but whatever puts butts in seats I guess. What’s interesting is that the theory is not actually being rejected by all Christians, and it is conversely pissing off some atheists, according to author Van Leeuwen.

First, let me explain the concept of how the brain works when dealing with beliefs (aka worldviews). There are two categories of beliefs being described:

  • Factual Beliefs. These are things that we believe as concrete facts (even if those beliefs are wrong or end up needing to be corrected). These are things like science, physical things we observe, but they also include historical information (things we read), etc. Our mind views these things in a category that is calls “facts” and they are not really negotiable. The brain believes them, but doesn’t place a strong emotional value to them or sentiment.
  • Religious Credence. These are things we believe that explain the world, that are linked to our values and feelings. They may explain facts and they feel factual on some level, but they function in the same way imaginary beliefs function. We can choose to believe these things, and some people will even try to demonstrate the strength of their belief by putting these beliefs over their factual beliefs, although it also an agreed-upon “pretense” to behave in this way, a performance to demonstrate the emotional commitment to the belief.

If you saw the Emma Stone movie Easy A, you may remember this exchange between her character and Fred Armisen’s pastor character. Olive (played by Stone) is upset about social events at school and her reputation which she has sacrificed to help some other people who then took advantage of her, and since she & her family are not religious, she thinks maybe religion will have some answers, so she enters a church to ask her questions.

Olive Penderghast I was just wondering what your church’s stance on lying and adultery was?

Pastor It’s not a good thing.

Olive Penderghast Oh, I agree wholeheartedly. But then, tell me this: assuming there is a Hell…

Pastor Oh, the Christian church recognizes the existence of Hell.

Olive Penderghast OK, so we’ll just say there’s a “Hell”…

Pastor There is. Just so we’re clear.

Olive Penderghast OK, but for argument’s sake…

Pastor No, there’s no argument, it’s there. Right below our feet. Right above the Orient.

Easy A

In this exchange, Armisen’s pastor character is using his Religious Credence views as if they are Factual Beliefs. The humor exists in the fact that he’s taking it to the extreme of making Hell a physical space with an exact location, right beneath their feet, but most religious people, when confronted with the theoretical nature of their religious beliefs will more or less concede the theoretical, loose nature of these beliefs.

Another major departure from most research on religious “beliefs” is a shift in focus from the contents of those beliefs to the attitude that is taken toward them: understanding this overlooked dimension clearly will illuminate how, why, and to what extent much religious practice is pretend play.

Neil Van Leeuwen

Van Leeuwen shares two excellent examples that illustrate the “pretend” nature of these beliefs. The first is the example of a grandmother babysitting when her granddaughter’s head gets caught in the spindles of the banister. The grandmother is frantic to rescue her, but the grandson doesn’t understand why it matters. “If she dies, she’ll just go to Heaven anyway.” With the crisis now past, the grandmother sees her grandson’s statement as naive. She knows something he hasn’t yet learned: that death is “factual,” and religious belief is “theoretical.”

Contrast that example with another one cited in which a father scolds his daughter for grieving too much for her deceased mother, explaining that it’s a lack of faith for her to be so upset. In this second example, the father’s attitude is about his daughter’s willingness to demonstrate her belief in the agreed-upon pretense that they know what has happened to the mother after her death. The daughter’s grief and the father’s lack of grief will not change the fact of the mother’s death, so instead, the father focuses on the comfort of and loyalty to his theoretical religious belief and insists his daughter do the same.

For a much simpler example in which the stakes are a bit lower, Van Leeuwen says that you can believe that a concrete slab is a soft bed. You can state this belief. You can agree to it with other people. But when you lay down on it, even if you claim it feels as soft as a real bed, you would not flop down on it or dive onto it headfirst because you know these beliefs are “pretend” or “imaginary,” and in this case, they contradict the factual beliefs you know about concrete.

When there is a conflict between “factual” beliefs and “religious credence” beliefs, choosing to follow the latter over the former requires a certain level of intentional pretense. The reason is that “factual” beliefs (even if they turn out to be wrong) are not voluntary. We don’t choose to believe them; we just do. But “religious credence” beliefs are voluntary. We can choose to believe them, and sometimes we do, even in the face of contradictory evidence. When we do this, our beliefs are similar to imaginary play in which we pretend an imaginary friend is talking to us or a cable buried in the creek is the mast of a pirate ship or some washers we found in our dad’s workshop are ancient coins.

Doubt and hope illustrate attitudes toward either type of belief. We can hope or doubt the present under the tree is the Malibu Barbie we’ve been asking for. We can hope or doubt that God exists. Hoping or doubting refer to how we process our beliefs, not the content of the belief. Additionally, the book distinguishes between cognitive and conative attitudes. In a cognitive statement, the person is processing belief about how things are. In a conative statement, they are processing how they want things to be, how they should be, a worldview they aspire to making true.

While Van Leeuwen uses the term “religious credence,” this type of thinking is not exclusive to religion (or to imaginative play). It can be nationalist beliefs or political views as well. It could be about family roles or work ethics. It’s more about how the mind works in relation to these beliefs.

As always, it’s easier to identify “imaginary” beliefs in other people than it is in ourselves. It is also easier to identify incorrect “factual” beliefs in others than in ourselves. The difference is that we can all probably see, if we’re honest, that “religious credence” beliefs are more like imaginative beliefs than factual beliefs, whether they are correct or not, and that they relate to our emotional experience, values, and group belonging in ways that factual beliefs just don’t (although the misinformation and conspiracy theory trends are pushing some of these factual beliefs into some very weird places).

  • Does this explanation make sense to you in relation to your religious beliefs?
  • Have you personally ever chosen your “religious credence” belief over your “factual” belief? Can you think of an example? Have you seen others do this?
  • Do you see how testimony bearing (using terms like “know” for religious credence beliefs) are more about attitude than facts?
  • Do you see danger in conflating “factual beliefs” and “religious credence”? Do you see benefit in separating them?

Discuss.

[1] Which retails for $42.65 on KINDLE for crying out loud. Is this book written on gold plates?? Even if it were, you wouldn’t get them on Kindle. It was a great discussion, but I’m not shelling out $43 for a fake book or even a real one. But the ideas they were discussing in the podcast were really interesting.